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Purpose:  The purpose of this thesis is to test if the depth of business cycles, i.e. if the 
acquisition is performed early or late within a cycle, affects performance. 
The intention is to contribute to M&A research by using stock market data 
and accounting data from selected companies to bring further light on post-
performance research by adding the variable of business cycles. The authors 
also wish to shed light on these issues by investigating whether acquisitions 
undertaken in boom and bust periods differ in success rate.  
 
Methodology:  This study is undertaken using a quantitative approach. The methodology 
has been completed to fit the purpose of the thesis and the given time frame. 
Two statistical tests, Student´s t-test and Wilcoxon Test, have also been 
performed in order to determine significance of the results. 
 
Empirical foundation:  M&A activity by companies on OMXS30 between 1994 and 2011.   
 
Conclusion:  The findings of this thesis imply that the abnormal returns of M&As varies 
across the business cycle. This suggests that top management at companies 
could gain a lot if they pay more attention to the business cycle and when to 
conduct M&As. The results of this thesis complement existing research on 
M&A performance in business cycles, e.g. Bouwman et al. (2007) and 
Pangarkar and Lie (2004), but it also adds to research by measuring 
performance in terms of depth of each business cycle.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“When the phone doesn’t ring, you’ll know it’s me.” 
(Warren Buffet´s opinion on when M&As should be conducted, 2011) 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Today, there are numerous companies seeking to grow through mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As). Looking at the history of M&As a known fact is that they often 
occur in larger waves. Harford (2005) and Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) found the 
reason to be regulatory, economic and technological factors together with sufficient 
liquidity of companies enabling them to pursue deals. Very often, these periods are 
characterized by strong capital markets and thriving optimism about future prospects 
(Gregoriou, 2007, p. 2). The waves have mainly been consisted of M&As done in the 
USA, but in the 1990s the fifth merger wave on the European market made the total 
value of the transactions in Europe comparable to the transaction value of M&As in 
USA (Appendix 7.6.1). One explanation is the implementation of the euro as currency 
in Europe, something that encouraged more transactions in the beginning of the 21th 
century. In the fifth merger wave, size did matter! High stock valuations combined 
with a global perspective on competition gave large companies the urge to grow 
bigger and to maintain or increase their market share. Large mergers during this 
period were, amongst many, Exxon and Mobil, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas and 
Vodafone and the German industrial giant Mannesmann, which was the largest 
merger of that time, (Lipton, 2006). This period, the late 1990s, would later be 
referred to as the “the decade of deregulation” by Andrade et al. (2001).  
 
Since this period M&A activity has declined in transaction value but there is still a 
vast number of firms wanting to grow outside their industry or business that use 
M&As as a way of achieving that. Internal, organic, expansion might not be sufficient 
for those managers that search for fast or new growing opportunities (Gaughan, 2007, 
p. 117). Although growing by M&As provides the most rapid way of growing, there 
are many uncertainties that need to be considered. Today, many say that M&A is a 
loser's game, but that is not always the fact. Instead there is evidence that M&A 
actually pay in general (Bruner, 2005, p. 7). This is contradictive to the findings of 
King et al. (2004). They found M&As not to be value creating. Performance of 
M&As depend on whether focus is on shareholders of the target firm or shareholders 
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of the acquiring firm. Research has proven that M&A pays for the shareholders of the 
target firm. From a bidder's perspective around 20-30 per cent of all transactions are 
generating returns in excess of the required return. Around 60-70 per cent of M&A 
deals are a success in the sense that the transactions are satisfying for the investors 
(Bruner, 2002). M&As are also associated with failures to meet expectations when 
synergies and growth are conspicuous with their absence. In those circumstances the 
buying firm sometimes overestimates the outcomes of an M&A. Research conducted 
by Rhodes- Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) and Javanovic and Rousseau (2001) 
indicates that M&A activity is driven by optimistic market expectations. Rhodes-
Kropf et al. (2005) support this research by empirical findings that market conditions 
give rise to M&A activity and in the end, merger waves. All M&A deals need to be 
structured individually to gain the highest possible probability of success. Synergies 
and growth does not come by themselves. 
1.2 Problem Discussion 
M&As have long been an object of fascination in the field of finance. Valuation 
impacts and motives behind deals are often the primary focus of researchers. 
However, M&As are complex in their nature and the concept contains many 
interdependent activities such as financing, integration, due diligence etc. (Hitt et al., 
2001). While some research have been sceptical towards the motives leading up to an 
M&A, e.g. Roll´s theory, which will be explained further later in the text, there is also 
research that points out hardship in realizing expected synergies like the “synergy-
trap” by Sirower (1997). There are numerous studies that focus on different aspects of 
M&A success; accounting based performance, stock market returns, cultural outcome 
etc. Aspects like relatedness and integration have been studied by Datta (1991), 
Larsson and Lubatkin (2001) and (Capron, 1999). Differences in size and overall 
power between the acquirer and the target firm have been conducted by Larsson and 
Finkelstein (1999). Some studies have focused on the short term impact, mostly done 
by event studies comparing expected levels of change with the actual changes that 
occurred at the announcement of the M&A. Studies like this take the investor 
perspective. Generally, the return for the target firm’s shareholders is greater than the 
return to the bidding firm's shareholders (Cheng et al., 2004). According to Gregoriou 
(2007) there are three factors that make M&A performance research rather dim: 
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 Wrong transactions are studied 
o many small deals are often excluded from the research 
 Faulty measurements of performance are used 
 Time frames used are wrongly adopted 
 
Existing M&A research has in the recent decades been extended to cover more than 
the financial aspects in M&A performance. While culture and organizational factors 
are more in focus today one should always keep in mind that there is not one correct 
way of measuring M&A success. Much of the research today is focused on other 
aspects than M&A in business cycles and human factors such as cognitive biases 
while performing an M&A. The literature has not fully covered this topic and the 
authors believe that there is much left to do. This area of research could provide 
important knowledge about top management decisions and when M&As pay and 
where they stray in the business cycle.  
Existing research on M&A activity, e.g. Rhodes- Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) and 
Schleifer and Vishny (2003), conclude that boom periods support higher M&A 
activity due to misevaluations. In the end, the misevaluations could be too excessive 
and potential value destroying. Other research, e.g. Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani 
et al. (1998), imply that M&A activity continue when it is already high because firm 
specific signals are ignored on behalf of predecessors. This suggests that firms doing 
M&A late in a merger wave are more likely to experience unprofitable deals. Rhodes- 
Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) suggest in their theory that misevaluations can lead to 
ex-post mistakes, correlated to high market valuations. In bust periods targets will 
consider bids where the premium outweighs the future outlooks. In boom periods 
targets tend to consider bids more favourable and the likelihood that the deal is 
completed increases. This could indicate that the best deals are done when markets are 
bearish. According to Bruner (2005) the worst deals are associated with “hot” equity 
markets. This thesis will expand existing research of M&A activity and connect it to 
post-deal performance to determine if M&A success is depending on business cycles. 
According to Pangarkar and Lie, (2004) acquiring in low market-value cycles has 
been shown to result in better performance. They suggest that managers of acquiring 
companies are less likely to pay high premiums, and therefore overpay, when the 
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market is low. A similar study was conducted by Bouwman et al. (2007). According 
to their findings they report higher announcement returns for firms during boom 
periods but lower long-run stock and operating performance compared to firms 
acquiring in bust periods. The sample for Bouwman et al. (2007) was collected 
between 1979 and 2002 and consisted of 2944 acquisitions performed in the US 
market. Another study by McNamara et al. (2008) brought light on M&As in merger 
waves. They found that acquirers gain higher returns when they acquired early within 
an industry merger wave whereas the returns for late acquirers are smaller.  
The authors will assess whether managers can evaluate information about the business 
cycles and cognitive biases as a tool to increase the success rate of M&A and to 
maintain adequate levels of stock returns. If so, can it be used as a strategic tool for 
managers to understand why they engage in M&A activity in different economic 
periods and how they can adjust the M&A activity to gain highest possible returns by 
understanding the overall economic trends. The research area of M&A performance is 
rather extensive. The area of this thesis however, i.e. the impact of business cycles as 
a determinant of acquisitions performance, has not been thoroughly researched. The 
few narrow studies do not take the depth of business cycles into account when 
measuring performance like this thesis will and the authors have not found any study 
performed on the Swedish market.    
The authors will apply one-research question, which will give more of a helicopter 
perspective, and then try this with four hypotheses. The first question is connected to 
business cycles and biases possibly influencing managers in M&A situations:  
 To what extent have firms on OMSX301 earned abnormal returns of M&As 
across the business cycle?  
For the first two hypotheses the aim is to look at boom periods as a yardstick for 
predicting M&A outcome. If the hypotheses stand, it would indicate that it is better to 
perform M&As early in boom periods.  
 
                                               
1 OMXS30 is an index consisting of Stockholm Stock Exchange 30 most traded shares. (OMXS30 Fact 
Sheet, 2012) 
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H.1 M&As carried out late within a boom period yield a higher risk of negative           
            abnormal returns 
H.2 M&As carried out early within a boom period yield a lower risk of negative 
abnormal returns 
 
The third and forth hypotheses will test the same parameters above but for bust 
periods instead. If the hypotheses stand, it would indicate that it is better to perform 
M&As late in bust periods.  
 
H.3 M&As carried out late within a bust period yield a higher chance of positive 
abnormal returns 
H.4 M&As carried out early within a bust period yield a higher risk of negative 
abnormal returns 
1.3 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to test if the depth of business cycles, i.e. if the 
acquisition is performed early or late within a cycle, affects performance. The 
intention is to contribute to M&A research by using stock market data and accounting 
data from selected companies to bring further light on post-performance research by 
adding the variable of business cycles. The authors also wish to shed light on these 
issues by investigating whether acquisitions undertaken in boom and bust periods 
differ in success rate.  
1.4 Demarcations 
The demarcations are made due to limited resources in terms of time and available 
data. Except this, there are additional methodological demarcations in chapter 2.   
 
 This thesis is limited to only measure performance across business cycles and 
performance in terms of depth of the cycles. Other aspects that could potential 
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have an effect on performance are not included, e.g. acquirer experience, 
payment method etc.   
 
 The data of this thesis has been collected from M&As performed by 
companies on the OMXS30 index in Sweden during the years 1994-2011. All 
deals must have been done by the parent company to be included in this 
sample. Some deals are made by subsidiaries but it has proven to be difficult 
to find adequate information about those deals. Most of the targets are private 
companies hence collection of information has been excluded from those 
companies. The information about the deals is based on press releases on the 
announcement of the deals accessed through DataStream2. 
 
 The included companies are on the OMXS30 as of today. The “today” 
restriction is used to avoid delisting biases, since well performing firms end up 
on OMXS30 and this change over time would a yearly selection only include 
successful firms.  
 
 Investment firms on OMXS30 have been excluded since they are acquisition 
experts. Companies within telecom and IT have been excluded because of the 
volatility hence average destroying results. It all comes down to companies 
within traditional industries, which are fairly stable. 
 
 There is no restriction about origin of the target neither if it is a public or 
private target.  
                                               
2 DataStream is a data base provided by Thomson Reuters 
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1.5 Outline 
 
 
2. Methodology
3. Research and 
theoretical background
4. Results and Analysis
5. Conclusion
Chapter two describes the research methods used 
to obtain and process data. It also provides an 
explanatory picture about what data was collected 
as well as methodological demarcations. 
This chapter provides the theoretical foundation for 
the thesis. Chapter three also covers aspects of 
measuring M&A performance. It also focuses on 
relevant theories about behavioral corporate finance 
and research about M&A in general.  
In chapter four the authors present the results of the 
thesis. The findings will be the result of our data 
sample, which were obtained using the research 
methods mentioned in chapter two. The empirical 
results will be presented and analyzed with the 
theories and research presented in chapter three. 
In chapter five there will be a concluding 
discussion about the findings in of this thesis. 
Thoughts and opinions about the findings will be 
expressed in addition to an acquisition guide and 
suggested further research proposals in the area of 
M&A in business cycles and behavioral aspects of 
M&A decisions.  
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2. Methodology 
This following chapter will present the methodological framework of the thesis. 
Different academic research methodologies have been reviewed and the most suitable 
are described below. The reader will be guided through the data sampling, why an 
event study is suitable and how the tests were conducted. Control variables that have 
been used are described. Also, how the results are validated and of primary and 
secondary data sources are scrutinized. Finally, there is a section of source criticism 
along with validity and reliability of the results. 
2.1 Literature Study 
The starting point of this thesis was a literature study. The literature has been a 
foundation for the deductive approach the authors have decided on. The authors have 
found most of the literature through online libraries with search criteria such as; M&A 
Performance; Drivers behind Mergers and Acquisitions; M&A waves; M&A and 
Business Cycle; M&A outcome; Mergers and Acquisitions short term performance, 
Mergers and Acquisitions long term performance; Event Studies. Additionally, the 
authors have used books mainly to give a wider perspective to the thesis. The 
aggregated mass of M&A studies is enormous where as the authors have tried give a 
brief introduction to prior research in chapter one. Chapter three will guide the reader 
through the most important theories for this study. The areas covered will be; M&A 
performance and what that is; M&A and Market Timing will guide the reader through 
research on when M&A should be conducted to be value creating; behavioral aspects 
of M&A refers to why management decide to engage in M&A activity; finally will 
Birkshire Hathaway’s M&A strategy be given as a practical example.  
2.2 Selection of Research Methodology 
After the topic of the thesis was decided upon the authors started to look for the best 
way to test and answer the hypotheses and research question. Since the fundamental 
aim is to research performance an event study is appropriate according to Mackinlay 
(1997).     
2.2.1 Event Studies 
When economic events are supposed to be measured event studies are used in various 
ways. Market data is used to evaluate the impact of a certain event in a firm during a 
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pre defined event window. In an event study it is very important that the event is easy 
to define. When calculating Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) an important factor 
is to evaluate the expected return without any event, i.e. the market return. There are a 
number of different approaches available; the main categories are statistical and 
economic. Models using a statistical approach rely solely on statistical assumptions 
and do not consider economic arguments, the economic models take investor´s 
behaviour into consideration but they are still dependent on statistical assumptions. 
Statistical models are commonly used and one of them is the Constant Mean Return 
Model (CMRM), which is a simple model in which the average normal rate of return 
is assumed to be constant for the calculation and the more developed Market Model 
that relates the return of a single share to the market portfolio. The Market Model is 
considered to be an elaborated version of the CMRM because its ability to eliminate 
returns created by the volatility of the market. This in turn reduces the volatility of the 
abnormal return. (MacKinlay, 1997) 
 
The economic models are the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Arbitrage 
Pricing Model (ATP) these models are no longer commonly used in event studies 
since they give little or no advantage over the statistical models, which are easier to 
use. (MacKinlay, 1997) According to MacKinlay (1997) there is little or no benefit in 
using the more sophisticated models and Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) show that 
there is little or no gain in using a risk adjusted model as well. Their suggestion is to 
use a market adjusted model (Eq. 2.1). 
2.2.1.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
An efficient market is a market where all available information is reflected in the 
share price. Fama (1970) developed this theory from existing theories called “Random 
Walk” and “Rational Expectations Theory” which did not have high credibility. It was 
first when Fama (1970) highlighted these theories it reached acceptance (Jensen, 
1978). Fama (1970) makes a separation between markets in:  
 
 Weak form 
  Semi-strong form 
 Strong form.  
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In the weak form investors may gain returns above the market through fundamental 
analysis, but not through technical analysis relying on historical share prices. A semi-
strong market implies that share prices rapidly react to all public information and no 
excess returns can be earned from trading on this information. Neither fundamental 
nor technical analysis will be a reliable way of beating the market. At a strong market 
the share price reflects all information and no one can earn excess returns. (Fama, 
1970) The assumptions behind the efficient market hypothesis are the foundation of 
an event study. Event studies rely on the efficient market hypothesis, that the market 
reflects all information immediately and that companies are fairly priced at their 
fundamental value. Hence, changes in the share price should be directly reflected to 
the announcement. In practise, there might be some differences though as markets 
might not react efficiently and situations affecting this could be e.g. due to restrictions 
to arbitrage, insider information and irrational behaviour.  
2.2.1.2 Description of Performance Measures  
The aim of this thesis is to measure M&A performance; the essence of this problem is 
to set up parameters of how to measure it. The most common method used to compare 
the return is to measure pre- and post merger data. Bidder’s performance will be 
measured with CAR and Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR). The returns 
will be measured at different points in time to get a wider view of the returns. The 
windows used will be T -2 to +2 days, T -6 to +24 days, and T -30 to +260 days.  
 
Figure 2.1: Event Windows  
 
1.  
  ߬ = −2																߬ = 0																			߬ = +2 
 
2.  
 ߬ = −6																߬ = 0																																														߬ = +24 
 
3.  
߬ = −30															߬ = 0																																																																																	߬ = +260	 
 
The first event window has been set up to cover a window without a lot of noise from 
other corporate actions but still big enough to take market changes into consideration. 
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MacKinlay (1997) does suggest measuring the outcome of different event windows 
and therefore getting a better precision in the data analysis. The second window is set 
up to cover eventual insider knowledge; this window covers 31 days and might be 
affected by other corporate actions. The last event window cover 291 trading days and 
will be disrupted by other corporate actions and the long event window does not align 
with the efficient market hypothesis, still it is included in the analysis to get a more 
long term perspective. The long-term performance will be measured with accounting 
data to support the findings of the event study. A further description of accounting 
data can be found in section 2.5.  
2.3 Data Selection 
In the data sample some restrictions have been in addition to the demarcations in 
section 1.4. Most of the targets are private companies hence collection of information 
has been excluded from those companies. The information about the deals is based on 
press releases on the announcement of the deals accessed through Datastream. When 
information was missing about the deal size the authors first investigate further 
through Internet search and if information was still missing the authors excluded the 
deal from the analysis. The final sample consists of 139 deals made by 16 companies 
over a period between 1994-06-07 until 2011-12-27. The last deal, performed in 2011, 
creates some implications on the last event window; still the authors included the deal 
in the analysis of the shorter event windows.  
2.3.1 Control Variables 
To eliminate misleading conclusions some control variables of M&A performance 
have been added.  
2.3.1.1 Relatedness 
Previous research suggest that relatedness of the firms in M&A transactions is an 
important factor to examine; more related companies are more likely to success. This 
would suggest that companies in unrelated industries would underperform. (Capron, 
1999) The relatedness in this thesis is based on the information of the press release or 
on the information given by Datastream. In the statistical testing this will serve as a 
control variable, taking the value 1 if the companies are related and 0 if they are 
unrelated.  
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2.3.1.2 Cross Border 
Cross border transactions is subject to more complexity, and complexity is shown to 
be correlated with poor performing deals (Hitt and Pisano, 2003). This variable added 
will take the value 1 if it was cross border deal and 0 if it was a domestic deal. 
2.3.1.3 Integration Form 
Horizontal M&As are expected to have a better post-performance compared with 
vertical mergers. This implies that organizational integration is important for the value 
creation of an M&A. (Capron 1999) In the sample the authors marked a horizontal 
M&A with 1 and a vertical M&A with 0. 
2.4 Equations and Calculations 
2.4.1 Abnormal Return 
The abnormal return (AR) formula is used for all samples during the event windows. 
In this thesis there are three time windows and AR is calculated for all three time 
windows throughout all samples. The formula to calculate AR is as follows:  
 
Equation 2.1: AR               ࢋ = ࡾ࢏࢚ −ࡾ࢓࢚ 
 
ܴ௜௧ = return on the stock i for day t 
ܴ௠௧ = return on the market portfolio for day t 
 
Source: Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) 
2.4.2 Cumulative Abnormal Return 
CAR is simply the sum of the AR in the event windows. In this thesis CAR is used for 
all event windows. The formula used to calculate CAR is: 
 
Equation 2.2: CAR               ࡯࡭ࡾ(࣎૚, ࣎૛) = ∑ ࡭ࡾ࣎࣎૛࣎ୀ࣎૚  
 
Source: MacKinlay (1997) 
2.4.3 Cumulative Average Abnormal Return 
After CAR is calculated for all sample deals it is possible to calculate CAAR. To 
calculate CAAR the following formula is used:  
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Equation 2.3: CAAR               ࡯࡭࡭ࡾ(࣎૚, ࣎૛) = ∑ ࡭࡭ࡾ࣎࣎૛࣎ୀ࣎૚  
 
Source: MacKinlay (1997) 
2.4.4 Variance of CAR 
In order to execute the Students t-test (see 2.4.6) the variance of CAR (V(CAR)) is 
needed. The formula used to calculate V(CAR) is:  
 
Equation 2.4:  V(CAR)               ࢂ(࡯࡭ࡾ) = ࣌࢏૛ = (࣎૚ − ࣎૛ + ૚)࣌ࢿ࢏૛  
 
Source: MacKinlay (1997) 
2.4.5 Variance of CAAR 
A variable needed for the completion of the t-test is the variance of CAAR 
(V(CAAR). In order to obtain V(CAAR) for all samples the following formula is 
used:  
 
Equation 2.5: V(CAAR)               ࢂ(࡯࡭࡭ࡾ(࣎૚, ࣎૛)) = ૚ࡺ૛∑ ,ࡺ࢏ୀ૚ ࣌࢏૛(࣎૚, ࣎૛)       
         
Source: MacKinlay (1997) 
2.4.6 Student´s t-test 
The t-test conducted is a statistical test in which the results acquired follow the t-
distribution if it supports the null hypothesis. A positive result indicates that the 
statistical accuracy is more reliable. The equation to calculate the t-test is:  
 
Equation 2.6: Student´s t-test               ࣎ = ࡯࡭࡭ࡾ(࣎૚,࣎૛)
ඥࢂ(࡯࡭࡭ࡾ(࣎૚,࣎૛))                 
Source: MacKinlay (1997) 
2.4.7 Wilcoxon Test 
The Wilcoxon Test is, as opposed to the t-test, a non-parametric test that is used to 
rank the data samples by size. In this case the abnormal returns for each event window 
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are ranked from 1, lowest value, to n, which is the highest value. The Wilcoxon Test 
is used to evaluate whether the results are significant or not. The main explanation 
behind having the Wilcoxon Test is that it eliminates results that are far from the 
mean average, so called outliners, which can have a large impact on the end result of 
the testing (Körner and Wahlgren 2006, ch.12). All the calculations of the Wilcoxon 
Test have been conducted in Excel.    
2.4.8 Normality Testing 
In order to test whether the data samples in each event window are normally 
distributed or not normality test needs to be used. There are a couple different 
normality tests that are more common than others, such as Andersson-Darling, 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shaprio-Wilk. For this thesis the Shapiro-Wilk test is used, 
which is most commonly used (Gastwirth et al., 2007). If the results from the Shapiro-
Wilk tests imply that the sample within the event window is normally distributed the 
t-test is the most relevant, while the Wilcoxon Test provides the most interesting 
results if the sample is not normally distributed. All calculations of Shapiro-Wilk are, 
like the Wilcoxon Test, performed in Excel. 
2.5 Long Term Performance of Bidding Firm 
The probability of success in an M&A deal is also influenced by prior performance of 
both the target and the bidder. The long-term performance of the bidder will be 
measured through return on sales (ROS) and return on assets (ROA). ROS and ROA 
are widely used performance measures in accounting studies (King et al., 2004). The 
accounting measures are taken from one year before the deal and one year after the 
deal. 
2.6 Defining Periods  
2.6.1 When Is it Boom and Bust Period? 
The authors´ desire is to examine if acquisitions in boom periods differ from 
acquisitions done in bust and neutral periods in terms of abnormal returns and how 
behavioural corporate finance can shed light on managerial thinking during those 
periods. The definition of boom and bust periods will therefore be crucial for the 
result of this thesis. To measure the temperature on the market, some definitions have 
been made. Using the same method as Bouwman et al. (2007) and Pangarkar and Lie 
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(2004) the P/E ratio is compared on monthly basis on OMXS30 on each deal in the 
sample and then compares that monthly P/E to the average P/E of OMXS30 for the 
last five years prior the acquisition month. If the P/E of that month is above the five 
year average it is defined as an above average acquisition (AAA) and if it is below the 
five year average it is defined as an below average acquisition (BAA). The boom 
period acquisitions are then calculated as the top half of the AAA deals while bust 
period acquisitions are calculated as the bottom half of the BAA. The period in 
between will be classified as neutral. One option to divide the market into cycles is to 
use GDP curve of Sweden. However, that would be hard to do due to the nature of the 
curve, which is notable by looking at the chart in Appendix, 7.3. There are alternative 
methods to divide the cycles into boom and bust periods, like Market to Book ratios, 
level of the S&P 500, quarterly P/E etc. However, Bouwman et al. (2007) find that 
using monthly P/E provides the best method for defining business cycles. In addition 
to Figure 2.2 there is a graph in Appendix 7.3 illustrating all deals in the sample 
relative to OMXS30.   
 
Figure 2.2: Business Cycle and Conducted M&As 
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2.6.2 Defining Depth of Cycle 
Since the authors did not find any research on M&A performance as a result of the 
depth of business cycles, a decision had to be made how to define early and late 
periods. For this thesis the median date of each boom and bust period is used each 
cycle into one early and one late period.  
2.6.3 Summary of Statistics 
From June 1994 to December 2011, the authors found 31 boom deals, 38 bust deals 
and 70 neutral deals. The boom deals represent 22 per cent of the total sample; bust 
deals represent 27 per cent and the neutral deals make up for the last 51 per cent. The 
results of the statistical tests will be presented in chapter 4. 
2.7 Literature Criticism 
Well-known researchers have produced the literature used throughout the thesis, this 
applies for both the books and articles used. The articles have been found through 
either Summon3 or Google-Scholar. The selected articles have been published in well-
known journals. The books were found through Lovisa4 and most of them have been, 
or is, used as course literature at Lunds Universitet. In cases where the books were 
found in other ways have the authors made sure that they are written by well known 
researchers. 
2.8 Validity and Reliability 
The validity of the results is controlled using control variables; these will help 
verifying other criteria’s effect on M&A performance in order to get higher validity of 
the results. With this the evaluation should gain some purity trying to measure 
performance as an effect of boom or bust periods. The event windows should not be 
overlapping in an event study to avoid problems with clustering. Calculations of 
variance assume no overlap between event windows over the securities hence no 
consideration has been taken to covariance. (MacKinlay 1997)  There can be some 
overlap in this study because of the high frequency of M&As during certain periods; 
this should not influence the results of the study to a greater extent since the data 
sample is quite big. With the time frames chosen for the event windows there will be 
risk of disruption of the results. The authors are aware of this and have a strong belief 
                                               
3 Summon is a search engine provided by Lunds Universitet 
4 Lovisa is the search engine for the libraries at Lunds Universitet 
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that the long-term performance of an M&A will be affected by other factors but the 
market reaction. Hence the event window is set to T+260 days. To increase the 
validity of these findings the authors have chosen to include some accounting based 
measures as well, which can be found in section 2.5. The data collection has been 
done mainly through the database Datastream. The authors are aware of the fact that it 
is a secondary source but it is well known and used by many and considered a reliable 
secondary source. The assumptions behind the market adjusted model that have been 
used for the event study relies on the efficient market hypothesis. This study is 
performed on large companies with high stock liquidity, which implies that the 
assumptions behind the efficient market hypothesis should stand. The overall opinion 
of the authors is that this study have high reliability and validity.   
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3. Research and Theoretical Background 
In this chapter the theoretical outline is presented alongside relevant research. The 
structure of the chapter is initially to provide a fundamental and brief view of M&As. 
This view will be narrowed down to explaining the stock market and share price as 
determinants of M&A success. Furthermore M&A timing in business cycles will be 
explained. After that there will be a description of relevant behavioural aspects that 
could possibly influence managers conducting M&As. In the end of the chapter there 
is a table summarizing the research relevant to this thesis. 
Figure  3.1 Theory outline
 
3.1 M&A in General 
3.1.1 Why Engage in M&A Activity? 
Some might argue that M&As is the most important decision a company can 
undertake. The number of M&As have increased in the most recent decades, as can be 
seen in Appendix 7.4.2. As a result, the research has become more extensive and 
complex in an attempt to fully comprehend the drivers behind M&A success and 
failure. According to Walker (2000) there are five motivations that drive firms to 
acquire or merge with other companies:  
1. Increased efficiency  
2. Asymmetric information exploitment between buying firm and target firm 
3. Reduced agency costs 
4. Enhanced market power 
5. Tax benefits 
Gaughan (2007) points out further motives that make firms engage in M&A: 
 Expansion/growth motives 
 Synergy effects for the buyer 
 Diversification 
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o M&As allow a company to move into different lines of business 
 Financial factors 
o The target firm might be undervalued 
 Tax motives 
 Improved management 
 Pride 
M&As is no longer considered to be a phenomenon driven solely by one factor. The 
range of perception about M&As has increased and so have the literature and the 
research within the field of M&A. Fields like culture, motivation and leadership are 
still to be explored further and patterns of drivers behind M&As are still to be found.  
3.1.2 M&A Performance 
According to Bruner (2002) there are three possible performance outcomes in M&A 
activity: 
 Value created 
o In this scenario the investment exceeds shareholders´ expectations. 
Wealth will grow above the level that investors require.  
 Value conserved.  
o The investment done equals shareholders´ required return. The deal has 
a NPV = 0 for the shareholders. Note that the shareholders might 
require high returns, and thus value conservation is according to their 
preferences of a “normal” return.  
 Value destroyed 
o The return is lower than anticipated and the investors are unhappy with 
the outcome of the M&A.  
3.2 Stock Market and M&A 
3.2.1 M&A Activity and Stock Market Correlation 
There are studies that have concluded that high stock market valuations are correlated 
with high M&A activity (Javanovic and Rousseau, 2001). High share prices, potential 
overvalued stock of the buying firms, of course impacts the performance. In the event 
20 | P a g e  
 
of a recession after the M&A an overvalued stock will most likely lose value and the 
performance of the transaction will therefore be negative. Additionally, cash offers 
are in general better than stock offers (Loughran and Vijh, 1997) and acquiring with 
value as an underlying idea, instead of acquiring for glamour, is more value creating 
for acquiring firm´s shareholders (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). In that sense 
misevaluations on the stock market can bring forth more M&A activity. This is 
supported by the work of Schleifer and Vishny (2003). Their assumption is that the 
financial markets are either inefficient or irrational. This is based on the fact that there 
are companies that are valued incorrectly. Those that understand those misevaluations 
can benefit from buying undervalued targets and potentially sell an overvalued 
company.  
3.2.2 Share Price as a Determinant of M&A Performance 
From the target´s perspective it is important to assess how the share price of the 
bidder will change during the deal period. If the shareholders of the target company 
know, or feel, that it is likely that the bidder's stock price will fall after the 
announcement of the deal they should be more reluctant to accept the deal. (Gaughan, 
2007, ch. 1) The proposed synergies that the bidding company sees might be 
overestimated and expectations on the deal could be estimated too highly. Besides 
looking at stock market performance, there are, according to Cooper (2005), two other 
ways of measuring M&A success or failure. These two ways are accounting based 
and sociocultural integration outcome. The majority of the research today is based on 
stock market performance, same as this thesis. 
3.3 Market Timing and Business Cycle Theory 
3.3.1 Market Timing Theory 
According to the theory markets are in strong form, while the managers in the bidding 
firms are subjected to hubris in the form of overconfidence and/or overoptimism. An 
M&A announcement often provides a strong signal to the financial markets and 
according to Roll (1986), the signal of hubris is embedded in a stock or cash offer. 
The implications of cash bids vs. stock bids according to the market timing theory are 
that a pure stock offers signals that the bidding firm's stock is overvalued. Paying a 
high portion cash signals that the bidder thinks that the target firm is undervalued and 
that there are higher synergies to be gained, synergies that would then be transferred 
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to the acquiring firm (Schleifer and Vishny, 2003). Under the market timing theory 
the bidding firm benefits from purchasing with cash when the amount paid is below 
the fundamental value of the target firm. Cash can also be used when the acquiring 
firm believes that their stock is undervalued (Dong et al., 2006). In general, cash 
financed deals could send double signals to the market: 
1. Hubris of the management (hubris hypothesis) 
2. Undervaluation of the target firm (market timing hypothesis)  
There is evidence that an overvalued bidder is more likely to use stocks as payment in 
an M&A. It also increases the probability of a bidder being a bidder in the first place 
and by that increasing M&A activity. Also, it shows that the bidding firms are 
performing poorly after the announcement of the M&A and subsequent periods after 
the M&A is made (Gregoriou, 2007, p. 8). This side of the coin, bidder overvaluation, 
should then be compared to target undervaluation to properly determine the market-
timing hypothesis.  
3.3.2 Existing Research on Strategy and M&A Timing Across Cycles 
In an article by Lubatkin and Chatterjee (1991) the authors imply that it is 
meaningless to investigate strategy and performance without taking the economic 
environment into account. They also find that related diversifiers earn higher returns 
than unrelated diversifiers during periods of market decline; hence they can manage a 
portion of the systematic risk even if it cannot be totally eliminated. Lubatkin and 
Chatterjee (1991) also suggest that this leads to higher performance and lower cost of 
capital and risk. Furthermore they suggest that acquiring targets with related strategy 
during bear cycles is correlated to excess returns. An implication for this, as they 
suggest, is that managers can use this knowledge to gain advantage over their 
competitors during times of economic uncertainty by being first movers and by that 
saying that cycles should be of high importance when formulating strategies. 
According to Bruner (2005), the worse deals are associated with “hot” equity markets.  
 
Again, one must remember that the theory of merger waves differs. Talking about 
merger waves the neoclassical theory suggests that industry shocks, i.e. changes in 
technology, regulation etc., is the driving factor of merger waves (Chidambaran et al., 
2009). This theory suggests that the returns will be higher prior to a merger wave than 
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during or after one. Taking the behavioral theory into account, it concludes that 
merger waves occur when there is a tendency for overvaluations in the market. This 
theory also states that both the announcement returns and the long-term returns of the 
acquiring firm’s shareholders are negative in such a scenario. Chidambaran et al. 
(2009) concludes that acquirers are valued higher during merger waves and that the 
premium paid to acquire targets also is higher during periods of high M&A activity. 
They also found support of more stock based purchases during the same period. 
Looking at the returns for the acquiring firm it is lower for stock based purchases, and 
it is also lower for acquisitions in booming merger markets. They found the results to 
be linked to the behavioral research by Schleifer and Vishny (2003). One of the 
earliest studies on performance in business cycles was conducted by Kusewitt (1985). 
He found, amongst many things, that timing relative to the market cycle is negative 
related to performance, i.e. that M&As are more likely to yield positive returns during 
economic decline. Hence M&As conducted during bust periods perform better 
compared to M&As executed in boom periods. He also concluded that the level of 
M&A activity is larger during high market valuations.  
 
According to McNamara et al. (2008) acquisitions occur in waves, which is concluded 
earlier in the thesis. However, they also found support that firms acquiring early in 
merger waves have an advantage compared to those acquiring late. The performance 
is in other words higher for firms that acquire early within a merger wave than for 
firms acquiring at the peak of it. McNamara et al. (2008) find those firms acquiring 
late in a merger wave, with lower performance than early acquirers, to be victims for 
the bandwagon effect. In addition to the previous mention research Lie and Pangarkar 
(2004) found that timing M&A in market cycles is important. They found that 
acquisitions, 115 in total performed by Singapore firms from 1990 to 1999, 
undertaken in low market conditions experienced higher CAR for both related and 
unrelated acquisitions compared to similar acquisitions made in hot markets.  
3.3.3 Wealth Effects for Acquiring Firm Shareholders 
The wealth effect in different M&A scenarios are well explored in research. In on of 
the bigger studies on M&A performance King et al. (2004) found that performance is 
unaffected by M&A activity and even negative in some extent. There is additional 
research that has found negative, or insignificant, wealth effects to acquiring firms, 
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e.g. Chatterjee (1992) finds support that acquisitions are value destroying in all cases 
for the acquiring firm´s shareholders. Bruner (2002) found that M&As are satisfying 
for investors in 60-70 per cent of all cases, which imply that M&As actually do pay 
on average.   
3.3.4 Business Cycle Management (BCM) 
BCM is not the most developed and highlighted field within M&A research. 
However, it is of importance due to this thesis link to performance in business cycles. 
Business cycles occur without a doubt in markets, which creates times of economic 
expansion and recession. Described in articles, such as Navarro et al. (2010), BCM is 
linking business cycles to managerial decisions. When those decisions are made in a 
timely matter, countercyclical, the performance of the firm should be improving. 
Dhalla (1980) supports this view by arguing that firms can take advantage of the 
swings in the markets to outperform their competitors. According to Dhalla firms can 
benefit from lower costs of marketing and expansion in recession periods to boost 
performance. Greer (1984) concludes that hiring employees during recessions would 
be beneficial due to lower wages paid and higher competence of the employees. 
Empirical studies that link BCM to M&A performance are scarce and the theory 
focuses mainly on marketing, leverage, capital expenditures and hiring employees 
during market cyclicities. There is an article by Lubatkin and O’Neill (1988), which 
concludes, ”certain types of mergers completed in certain economic contexts can 
enhance the wealth of stockholders in the acquiring firms”. In the article by Navarro 
et al. (2010), they found preliminary evidence that countercyclical management 
actions such as investments are associated positively with the performance of the 
investigated firms.  
3.4 Behavioural Aspects of M&A 
3.4.1 Behavioural View of M&A 
The behavioural area of M&A research is growing strong. Under this field of research 
managerial decisions are viewed in the light of personal characteristics that affect 
M&A activity. Looking further at motives behind M&A hubris can be one 
explanation according to Roll (1986). Hubris in this case takes the form of 
overoptimism or/and overconfidence. To simplify, hubris basically leads to a 
misevaluation of the target company. The valuation is above the fair value of the 
24 | P a g e  
 
target, which leads to the acquirer overpaying. This hubris hypothesis states that there 
are no synergies available to the buying firm and that the premium paid stays with the 
target firm's shareholders. A lot of M&As are performed with the belief in large 
synergy creation and by capturing that value the acquiring firm can pay more for a 
target firm that can give rise to such synergies (Hitt et al., 2001). As mentioned 
previously the definition of synergies is that it makes the combined “value” larger 
than the sum of two companies individually and this is because of cost reductions or 
income increases due to a higher grade of operational efficiency, market power or 
other (Seth et al., 2000). On average, the higher the potential synergies, the higher the 
premium to get a hold of them. The higher the premium, the higher the return needs to 
be to justify the high premium. Even a small premium cannot be justified without 
synergies being realized (Hitt and Pisano, 2003). Looking further at hubris, 
management who know they have overpaid for a target will be more likely to search 
for the fastest way of generating money to justify the premium by cutting costs or 
taking other short-term measures that might not be beneficial in the long run. It can 
also result in asset divestitures, which often proves to be a failing strategy due to 
assets being sold below the book value (Krishnan et al., 2007). Decisions that have to 
be made by the management in an M&A often require large efforts and the CEOs and 
the boards of the companies must withstand high pressure from the market to realize 
value. 
 
“Why did CEOs do so many deals . . . ? The bull market was a big reason, 
of course. Executives were brimming with confidence and rich stocks.” 
(Business Week, 14 October 2002, p. 68) 
 
3.4.2 Managerial Herding 
One theory explaining M&A performance is managerial herding. Some scholars argue 
that merger waves occur because of managerial herding in the firms conducting 
M&As (Goel and Thakor, 2008). If managers see that their competitors are achieving 
higher return due to higher M&A activity they are more likely to engage in M&A 
activity themselves. If the same managers later on notice that their competitors 
stopped or slowed down their M&A activity, then the managers will follow their 
example and stop their M&A activity as well. Research by Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004) supports this by saying that merger waves only end when the 
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market has learned from experience by relating to the success rate of previous 
acquirers. The hypothesis also predicts that M&A performance is more likely to be 
worse for late movers during merger waves than for first movers. This hypothesis has 
some support, e.g. by research provided by McNamara et al. (2008). Since merger 
waves tend to correlate with market valuations, the managerial herding theory is 
important to this thesis.  
3.4.3 Pricing Points and Anchoring 
Estimating pricing points is originally a subfield within marketing research. In that 
area, demand is viewed in the light of sensitivity to different price settings when it 
comes to retail pricing. In M&A, the bidding firm wants to propose a bid as low as 
possible for the target firm. In order to get the approval of the target firm´s 
shareholders the bidder is aiming to offer a bid that will lead to a successful M&A 
deal. Theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) identify wealth and levels of 
belongings as drivers of highest possible utility. In addition, their theory states that 
this perceived utility changes relative to reference points, e.g. norms. Having pricing 
points as reference makes investors more reluctant to sell stocks or financial assets 
showing losses than to similar assets showing gains (Birru, 2009). Reference point 
theory is complementary to other theories of M&A. However, it is useful when it 
comes to viewing premiums paid to acquire firms. The link between M&A activity 
and stock market conditions can therefore be explained. This is in line with business 
cycle research done by Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004), who all found M&A activity to be correlated to misevaluations 
on markets.  
3.4.4 The Bidder´s Perspective 
In the attempt to acquire a target the psychology of the bidder can be affected by 
biases such as anchoring, mentioned in section 3.4.3, and adjustment, phenomenons 
mainly associated with Tversky and Kahneman (1974). Basically in an M&A world, it 
says that a final estimate, such as determining target firm´s enterprise value, is based 
on a potential irrelevant and perhaps salient initial value. The estimation the bidding 
firm makes of the target firm´s value will later reflect the amount offered in the M&A 
process. In the estimations it is common to use 52-week high stock price as a counter 
point in the valuation process. By stating a 52-week high the bidding firm assumes 
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that old share prices are realizable even in the future, thus making it possible to reach 
them again after the acquisition is made. Reference pricing can in that extent be 
connected to M&A occurrences like merger waves, deal success and bidding prices.  
3.4.5 Managerial Influential 
Managers responsible for M&A decisions are highly affected by external factors and a 
CEO´s career can rely on the success of an M&A (Aktas et al., 2005). Research has 
found that the acquiring firm's abnormal return declines by every deal made (Conn et 
al., 2004). This would imply that CEOs and managers do not learn from doing M&As. 
In reality this is hard to assess and it is more likely to believe that managers are 
instead rational not risk seeking. It is not easy to assess which bias is the dominating 
one when conducting M&As. A bias worth mentioning is winner´s curse, which can 
be an example of hubris of the managers in the acquiring firm, something that often 
lead to costly acquisitions. 
3.5 A Practical Example 
3.5.1 Berkshire Hathaway Acquisition Criteria 
In the beginning of this thesis the reader was introduced by a quote of Warren Buffet:  
 
“When the phone doesn’t ring, you’ll know it’s me.” 
 
The success story of Warren Buffet and Berkshire Hathaway is well known in the 
field of finance and M&A. This company can be used to further point out what creates 
value in M&A transactions as well as discussing biases that can lead to unsuccessful 
M&A decisions done by managers. The opening quote also gives an indication of 
when M&As should be conducted in the market cycles. There is no doubt that Warren 
Buffet is of the opinion that M&As should not be performed in boom periods. 
Looking further at Berkshire Hathaway they have six criteria for target firms that have 
to be fulfilled before an investment is discussed:  
1. Target firms have to have at least $ 74 million of earnings, pre-tax 
2. The earnings power must be strong 
3. Return on equity (ROE) has to be strong, meanwhile having low leverage in 
the balance sheet 
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4. The management in the target firm must have potential and stay after the 
investment is made 
5. Berkshire Hathaway only invests in understandable businesses 
6. An offering price has to be known 
All of the takeovers should be friendly and the method of payment is mainly cash. 
Berkshire Hathaway does not engage in auctions while investing in companies. 
Looking at the size of the investment it is usually in the range of $ 5 - 20 billion. 
Another thing worth mentioning is that Berkshire Hathaway always approaches the 
companies in which they would like to invest, not the other way around. After an 
investment is made the management is kept alone and still makes the operating 
decisions and the excess cash is transferred to headquarters to prevent overinvestment 
problems (Berkshire Hathaway annual report 2011). 
3.6 Summary of Research 
The research field of M&A is extensive. To comprehend M&A it is important to 
understand why they occur in markets. It is also important to understand the stock 
market and share price correlation to M&A research. Behavioural theories are 
described as an extra tool that can clarify and help understand the research field and 
findings. For this thesis and M&A performance in business cycles the authors find the 
following findings relevant: 
 
Table 3.1 Summary of Research 
Authors Research field Conclusion 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) Behavioural Personal wealth and level of belongings determine utility 
Roll (1986) Behavioural Hubris can affect M&A activity 
Sirower (1997) Buyer/Seller The relatedness between buyer/seller has increased. Premiums has become higher 
Cartwright and Cooper (1996) Integration form Horizontal integration has increased on behalf of vertical integration 
Cheng (2006) Merger waves Market misevaluations increase M&A activity and alter the behavior in takeover contests 
Goel and Thakor (2008) Merger Waves Merger waves occur due to managers mimicking of first moving firms in the industry 
Javanovic and Rousseau (2001) Merger waves High stock market valuations = higher level of M&A activity 
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Rhodes- Kropf and Viswanathan 
(2004) Merger waves 
Market misevaluations can set forth a more active 
M&A market. Merger waves end with the market 
learning from previous bad experiences 
Schleifer and Vishny (2003) Merger waves Misevaluations on the stock market can give rise to more M&A activity 
Bouwman et al. (2007) Performance 
Long run performance of firms acquiring during 
low-valuation markets are higher than for those 
firms acquiring during high-valuation markets 
Chatterjee (1992) Performance Acquisitions results in insignificant or negative wealth effects for the acquiring firm 
Bruner (2002) Performance 
From a bidder´s perspective 20-30 percent of all 
transactions generate excess returns. 60-70 percent 
of  all M&A deals are satisfying for the investors 
Lubatkin and Chatterjee (1991) Performance 
It is meaningless to instigate strategy and 
performance without taking the economic 
environment into account. Acquiring targets with 
related strategy in bear markets is correlated to 
excess returns 
Chidambaran et al. (2009) Performance Lower returns for acquisitions in booming merger markets 
King et al. (2004) Performance M&A activity is uncorrelated to higher returns of the acquiring firm. M&As are not value creating. 
Kusewitt (1985) Performance Acquisition timing relative to the market cycle is negative correlated to performance 
McNamara et al. (2008) Performance 
Firms acquiring early within an industry 
acquisition wave achieve positive returns, whereas 
the market punish later acquirers. 
Pangarkar and Lie (2004) Performance 
Announcement returns are higher during high-
equity market cycles than low-equity market 
cycles 
Banerjee (1992) Performance 
Late movers in merger waves are more likely to 
experience unprofitable acquisitions than early 
movers, even though they benefit of information 
early acquirers 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) Profitability M&A is not profitable tool to gain market power or more favorable market position 
Capron (1999) Relatedness 
Value in M&A is created through high  
Strategic combination between acquiring  
and the target firm 
 
  
29 | P a g e  
 
4. Results and Analysis 
In this chapter the results are presented and analysed starting with the accumulated 
results of the boom periods. After that the accumulated results for neutral and bust 
periods are presented. In the third step boom and bust results are compared to 
neutral periods and to each other. Additionally, to test the hypotheses, the results of 
deals done early or late in business cycles are compared. The last part of this 
describes accounting data results.    
4.1 Introduction to the Results 
The authors did collect a large amount of data and information of different deals made 
between 1994 and 2011: When the data had been analyzed it was found to be very 
homogenous in terms of relatedness and origin of the target company and if it was a 
horizontal or vertical deal. This will be describer further in section 4.6. In the 
following section the results from the final data sample will be presented. All the 
testing is performed with a 95 per cent confidence interval, which provide an alpha 
value of 0,05.    
4.2 Cycles Periods 
4.2.1 Boom Period 
In this section the results for acquisitions performed in boom periods are displayed 
and analyzed. The table below describes results for the three event windows used in 
this thesis.  
 
Table 4.1 CAAR – Accumulated for all Boom Periods 
Event Window CAAR 
Students t-test Wilcoxon S-W 
T T-crit P P P 
(1) -2 to +2 -0,0019 -0,2122 2,0423 0,8334 0,860 0,005 
(2) -6 to +24 -0,0130 -0,9663 2,0423 0,3416 0,405 0,035 
(3) -30 to +260 -0,1108 -1,5756 2,0423 0,1256 0,961 0,001 
 
The S-W results on the right side of the table indicate that the sample cannot be 
assumed to follow a normal distribution for any event window, hence the Wilcoxon 
results should be used in favour of the results of Student´s t-test. The Alpha value is 
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0,05 for all tests. Looking at the results of the Wilcoxon Test it suggests that the null 
hypothesis is accepted for all event windows, i.e. that there are no significant negative 
abnormal returns in doing M&As in Boom periods.   
4.2.2 Neutral Period 
In this section the results for acquisitions performed in neutral periods are displayed 
and analysed. This is done to get an additional benchmark for the result of the boom 
and bust periods. The table below describes results for the three event windows used 
in this thesis.  
 
Table 4.2 CAAR – Accumulated for all Neutral Periods 
Event Window CAAR 
Students t-test Wilcoxon S-W 
T T-crit P P P 
(1) -2 to +2 -0,0047 -1,0579 1,9949 0,2937 0,142 0,001 
(2) -6 to +24 -0,0064 -0,7698 1,9949 0,4440 0,228 0,001 
(3) -30 to +260 -0,0497 1,3151 1,9949 0,1928 0,721 0,001 
 
Starting with the results of the S-W test it shows that none of the results in the event 
windows are normally distributed. The results to look at are the ones from the 
Wilcoxon Test. Since the results of the Wilcoxon are above 0,05 for all event 
windows it can be concluded that M&A done in neutral periods do not show any 
significant abnormal returns. The null hypothesis is thereby accepted.  
4.2.3 Bust Period 
In this section the results for acquisitions performed in bust periods are displayed and 
analysed. The table below describes results for the three event windows used in this 
thesis.  
 
Table 4.3 CAAR – Accumulated for all Bust Periods 
Event Window CAAR 
Students t-test Wilcoxon S-W 
T T-crit P P P 
(1) -2 to +2 0,0045 0,6981 2,0262 0,4894 0,147 0,002 
(2) -6 to +24 0,0499 3,4032 2,0262 0,0016 / 0,058 
(3) -30 to +260 -0,0456 0,9580 2,0262 0,3443 / 0,447 
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Looking at the S-W results on the right side of the table it indicates that the sample 
distribution can be assumed to be normally distributed for the second and third event 
window but not for the first event window. The Wilcoxon results should then be be 
used in favour of the results of Student´s t-test only on the first event window. By 
looking at the results of the Wilcoxon Test it suggests that the null hypothesis is 
accepted for the first event window, i.e. that there are no significant positive abnormal 
returns in doing M&As in Bust periods. For the second event window the results of 
the t-test imply that investors gain abnormal returns close to five per cent in bust 
periods. The t-test result on the third event window supports the null hypothesis.   
4.2.4 Analysis of Cycle Periods 
The results indicate that there cannot be any significant abnormal returns in any 
business cycle except for the second event window in bust periods. For the second 
event window, -6 to +24 days related to the announcement, there are significant 
abnormal returns close to 5 per cent. This is in line with Bouwman et al. (2007).  They 
found that the long-run performance for acquiring firms during bear markets is higher 
than for those acquiring during high-valuation markets. The results indicate however, 
that for the longest event window -30 to +260 days, there are insignificant abnormal 
returns. For the boom periods all event windows indicated no abnormal returns. The 
abnormal returns of the second event window in bust periods support the findings of 
Lubatkin and Chatterjee (1991), who found that firms always should evaluate the 
economic environment when undertaking strategic decisions. Since this thesis came 
up with insignificant results for the event windows during boom periods the research 
of Chidambaran et al. (2009) cannot be supported. As the results of the table above 
indicate the abnormal returns are lower for boom periods than for bust periods.  
 
Kusewitt (1985) found market timing to market cycles to be negative correlated to 
performance. For the sample there are indications that support that research. The 
significant abnormal return for bust periods in the second event window in this thesis 
also support the research of Pangarkar and Lie (2004), who found that performance of 
acquiring companies to be better during low market cycles. However, it should be 
pointed out that the results are insignificant, and therefore not valid, for all event 
windows except the second event window in the bust period. Chatterjee (1992) 
suggest that acquisitions results in insignificant or negative wealth effects to the 
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acquiring firm´s shareholders. This theory is partially rejected due to the significant 
findings of abnormal returns for the second event window in bust periods. Finally, the 
results of section 4.2.3 contradict the research of King et al. (2004). They found that 
M&As are not value creating.  
4.3 Comparing Business Cycles 
In section 4.2 the authors tested each business cycle individually. In this section the 
business cycles are compared to each other in order to analyse whether it is more 
beneficial to do M&As during certain business cycles and if the significance of the t-
test and Wilcoxon Test differ from testing each individual business cycle 
4.3.1 Boom vs. Bust Period  
The first test will compare boom and bust periods to each other in order to analyse 
whether it is more beneficial to do M&As during certain business cycles.  
 
Table 4.4 CAAR – Boom vs. Bust Period 
Event Window 
CAAR 
Boom 
CAAR 
Bust 
Students t-test Wilcoxon S-W 
T T-crit P P P 
(1) -2 to +2 -0,0019 0,0045 -0,5821 2,0025 0,5628 0,840 0,002 
(2) -6 to +24 -0,0130 0,0499 -3,1621 1,9960 0,0024 / 0,120 
(3) -30 to +260 -0,1108 -0,0456 -0,1549 1,9905 0,8773 0,578 0,001 
 
By looking at the S-W results on the right side of the table it indicates that the sample 
distribution cannot be assumed to follow a normal distribution under the first and 
third event window, hence the Wilcoxon results should be used in favour of the 
results of Student´s t-test on those two event windows, which do not reject the null 
hypothesis. In the second event window the S-W results is above 0,05 and the t-test is 
low enough to provide significance, by that meaning that there is comparability 
between boom and bust periods. This implies that it is better to perform acquisitions 
in bust periods compared to boom periods in the time span of the second event 
window and that the difference in abnormal returns are 6,29 per cent.  
4.3.2 Bust vs. Neutral Periods  
By comparing bust and neutral period acquisitions the gain is better comparability of 
performance between business cycles.  
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Table 4.5 CAAR – Bust vs. Neutral Periods 
Event Window 
CAAR 
Bust 
CAAR 
Neutral 
Students t-test Wilcoxon S-W 
T T-crit P P P 
(1) -2 to +2 0,0045 -0,0077 1,1282 1,9822 0,2617 0,041 0,011 
(2) -6 to +24 0,0499 -0,0144 1,5496 1,9870 0,1248 0,001 0,018 
(3) -30 to +260 -0,0456 -0,0632 0,0583 1,9921 0,9537 0,473 0,001 
 
Since the S-W results are less than 0,05, for all event windows, it is again better to use 
the non-parametric Wilcoxon Test in favour of the parametric t-test. For the first and 
second event window the results, calculated with Wilcoxon, are below 0,05. This is 
saying that the abnormal returns are higher in bust periods than in neutral periods for 
the first two event windows. For the last event window the abnormal returns are not 
significantly different during bust and neutral periods. For the last event window the 
null hypothesis is accepted. 
4.3.3 Analysis of Cross Cycle Periods 
In this section the results indicates significance for three event windows. The first 
significant result is a negative abnormal return, 6,29 per cent, for acquiring in boom 
periods compared to bust periods in the second event window. For the other two event 
windows the results are insignificant, yet negative. The other two significant results 
occurred measuring bust periods to neutral periods. For the first event window the 
results indicated a very small positive abnormal return in favour for the bust period 
adding up to a difference of 1,22 percent and for the second event window the 
abnormal returns add up to 6,43 per cent. This indicates that it is beneficial for firms’ 
shareholders to perform acquisitions in bust periods rather than neutral periods under 
the first and second event window. When viewed in total, the results of this testing is 
in line with the findings of Lubatkin and Chatterjee (1991), who found that the 
economic environment has to be consider when undertaking strategic decisions like 
M&As. The result indicates that M&As can be performed in bust periods with higher 
abnormal returns than M&As in neutral and boom periods. Again, the finding of 
Kusewitt (1985) becomes accepted. The findings of Pangarkar and Lie (2004), which 
only measured high against low market performance of M&As, are accepted for the 
second event window in the comparison between boom and bust periods. The test 
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results for section 4.3 adds another aspect, due to the results of the first two event 
windows in table 4.5, to the research of Pangarkar and Lie. Their research did not 
compare low market valuations to neutral market valuations. Due to some significant 
positive abnormal returns in section 4.3 the findings of King et al. (2004) can be 
rejected.  
4.4 Business Cycle Timing Results  
To test the hypotheses, i.e. if the abnormal returns are higher (lower) for the acquiring 
firm when the acquisition is performed late within a bust period (boom period). 
According to the method outlaid in chapter two there are three boom periods and four 
bust periods during the sample period. In this section the authors decided to exclude 
neutral periods and only focus on boom and bust periods. More descriptive figures of 
the different business cycle periods with corresponding deals in each period can be 
found in Appendix (7.7.1 – 7.7.7) and in Figure 2.2.  
4.4.1 Late Boom periods vs. Early Boom periods 
To be able to answer hypotheses testing need to be done on performance, both early 
and late, in the different business cycles, starting with comparing the first half against 
the second half of each business cycles itself. This will test whether it is more 
beneficial to perform M&As at an early or late stage in the business cycle.   
Table 4.6 CAAR – Late Boom vs. Early Boom Periods Accumulated 
Event Window 
CAAR 
Early  
CAAR 
Late 
Students t-test Wilcoxon S-W 
T T-crit P P P 
(1) -2 to +2 0,0066 -0,0113 1,0964 2,0595 0,2833 0.348 0,005 
(2) -6 to +24 -0,0069 0,0016 -0,3043 2,0687 0,7636 0,678 0,035 
(3) -30 to +260 0,0306 -0,1930 1,7035 2,0739 0,1026 0,230 0,001 
 
Starting with the results of the S-W test it concludes that none of the results in the 
event windows can be normally distributed. The results to be looking at are the ones 
from the Wilcoxon Test. Since the results of the Wilcoxon is above 0,05 for all event 
windows it can be concluded that M&As done in late boom periods do not differ 
significantly from the ones done in early boom periods in terms of abnormal returns. 
The null hypothesis is thereby accepted. These results do not support H1 nor H2. 
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4.4.2 Late Bust vs. Early Bust periods 
The previous table tested acquisitions done in late boom periods against early boom 
periods. In the table below the same parameters are tested but this time for bust 
periods. 
 
Table 4.7 CAAR – Late Bust vs. Early Bust periods Accumulated 
Event Window 
CAAR 
Early 
CAAR 
Late 
Students t-test Wilcoxon S-W 
T T-crit P P P 
(1) -2 to +2 -0,0053 -0,0017 -0,2953 2,0739 0,7706 0,678 0,002 
(2) -6 to +24 -0,0078 -0,0069 -0,0305 2,0739 0,9759 / 0,058 
(3) -30 to +260 0,0331 0,0891 -0,7157 2,0484 0,4801 / 0,447 
 
The results of the S-W test conclude that the samples in the first event window cannot 
be normally distributed. However, the results from the second and third event 
windows assume normal distribution. For the first event window the result to be 
looking at is the Wilcoxon one. Since the p value is above 0,05 the null hypothesis is 
not rejected and therefore there are no significant difference in abnormal returns doing 
M&As in late vs. early bust periods in the first event window. For the second and 
third event windows the t-test is appropriate to look at. The t-test suggests no 
significant difference in abnormal returns under those two event windows, i.e. no 
significant difference in doing acquisitions in late or early bust periods. Hence there is 
no evidence of either H3 or H4.  
4.4.3 Late Boom periods vs. Late Bust periods  
This test will assess whether acquisitions in late boom periods differ in abnormal 
returns from acquisitions done in late bust periods.  
 
Table 4.8 CAAR – Late Boom vs. Late Bust Periods Accumulated 
Event Window 
CAAR 
Late Bo 
CAAR 
Late Bu 
Students t-test Wilcoxon S-W 
T T-crit P P P 
(1) -2 to +2 -0,0011 -0,0021 -0,6687 2,0518 0,5093 / 0,794 
(2) -6 to +24 -0,0022 -0,0073 0,2485 2,0518 0,8056 / 0,082 
(3) -30 to +260 -0,1934 -0,0892 -2,2403 2,0860 0,0366 0,247 0,034 
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Since the S-W results are more than 0,05 in the first and second event window it is 
better to use the parametric t-test in favour of the Wilcoxon test. For the third event 
window the S-W result is below 0,05, saying that it is better to use Wilcoxon test. 
There is no significance shown in any of the event windows suggesting no difference 
in abnormal returns. The results are not sufficient to reject the null hypothesis.   
4.4.4 Early Boom periods vs. Early Bust Periods  
The last testing for differences in abnormal returns is in early boom periods compared 
to early bust periods.  
 
Table 4.9 CAAR – Early Boom vs Early Bust Periods Accumulated 
Event Window 
CAAR 
Early Bo 
CAAR 
Early Bu 
Students t-test Wilcoxon S-W 
T T-crit P P P 
(1) -2 to +2 0,0066 -0,0053 0,8208 2,0930 0,4219 0,637 0,001 
(2) -6 to +24 -0,0069 -0,0078 0,0459 2,0452 0,9637 / 0,503 
(3) -30 to +260 0,0306 0,0331 -0,0296 2,0595 0,9766 0,230 0,001 
 
By looking at the S-W results on the right side of the table it indicates that the sample 
distribution cannot be assumed to follow a normal distribution under the first and 
third event window, hence the Wilcoxon results should be used in favour of the 
results of Student´s t-test on those two event windows. The results of the t-test show 
no significance though. In the second event window the S-W results is above 0,05 and 
the t-test is the relevant one. However, the result is not high enough to provide 
significance, by that meaning that there is no significant difference in abnormal 
returns for the second event window in early boom periods compared to early bust 
periods.  
4.4.5 Analysis of Performance Relative Depth of Cycles 
As described in the beginning of this thesis and in chapter 3, the research on 
performance in different depths across business cycles is scarce. Rhodes- Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004) described merger waves as the results of a bandwagon effect and 
that those who perform acquisitions in the beginning of those waves benefit while 
those companies who are performing acquisitions later experience negative results. 
McNamara et al. (2008) made a study were they concluded that the returns would 
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decline as a merger wave progresses. Again, this thesis is not focusing on merger 
waves per se but rather on the value of the market to determine performance. The 
results of McNamara et al. (2008) cannot be comparable to the results of this thesis 
unless there is absolute correlation between merger waves and the equity market, 
which there is not. The calculations in this thesis implied three boom periods between 
1998-06-01 and 2002-07-30. Research on merger waves concludes that three merger 
waves did not occur during this period (Lipton, 2006).  
 
Analyzing the results of this thesis it suggests no significant results comparing the 
first half against the second half of M&A performance in bust and boom periods. One 
of the results, i.e. the third event window comparing late boom against late bust 
periods had an S-W result of 0,034. If the value had been higher than 0,05 the t-test 
would have proved significant negative returns of 19 per cent of deals performed in 
late boom periods compared to deals performed in late bust periods. Other 
insignificant results are that late boom periods yield more negative results than early 
boom periods and that acquiring in late bust periods are better than acquiring in early 
bust periods. If the sample would have been larger the results might have been 
normally distributed and therefore significant, saying that it is worse performing 
M&As in late boom periods compared to late bust periods and that early bust periods 
yield higher return than early boom periods. According to Roll (1986) the results can 
be connected to hubris of managers and other biases making acquiring firms more 
prone to make unsuccessful deals. Due to insignificant results in section 4.4 this thesis 
can neither support nor contradict the research by Banerjee (1992), in which late 
movers in merger waves are more likely to experience unprofitable acquisitions than 
early movers. Again, it is important to comprehend that this thesis is taking business 
cycles as measuring points, and not merger activity per se. In that sense the results are 
incomparable to the few related studies on business cycle timing and acquisition 
performance across the cycles.  
4.5 Long run Performance 
Accounting data has been included in the thesis to measure performance. The main 
objective is to see whether the long run performance of the acquiring firm is affected 
by its M&A activity. This is used as a complementary measure to the event study. The 
findings from the statistical tests are presented bellow. First of all did the authors 
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choose to exclude ROS simply because the correlation between ROS and ROA was 
close to 1(0,999) with a significance level of 95 per cent.  
4.5.1 Long Run Performance of All Deals 
 
Table 4.10 ROA Before and After an M&A  
ROA Before After 
Students t-test Wilcoxon S-W 
T T-crit P P P 
All 0,108 0,093 2,170 1,969 0,031 0,006 0,001 
Boom 0,102 0,079 1,970 2,003 0,054 0,299 0,001 
Bust 0,097 0,101 -0,271 1,994 0,787 0,906 0,003 
 
As shown in table 4.10 the sample does not follow a normal distribution according to 
the S-W test. As a result of that the Wilcoxon Test is appropriate to use in favor of the 
Students t-test. The p-value of the Wilcoxon test for all deals is at a level where the 
null hypothesis is rejected and the difference between ROA before and after the deals 
is significant. The tests shows a 1,5 per cent higher ROA before the transaction 
compared to the ROA after the transaction. When the sample was divided into boom 
and bust periods no significance were found, hence the null hypothesis is accepted 
and no mean difference is proven. 
4.6 Control Variables 
After the data was collected the authors found a great degree of homogeneity in the 
sample. Hence a more developed analysis including the different variables would 
have been point less.  
 
Figure  4.1 Control Variable / Cross Border 
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Figure  4.2 Control Variable / Relatedness 
 
 
 
Figure  4.3 Control Variable / Integration Form 
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5. Conclusion 
This chapter contains the final discussion of the test results. The opinions of the 
authors will be explained as well as final part with ideas and suggestion about 
interesting future research fields for studies about M&A performance across business 
cycles 
5.1 End Discussion  
The authors wish to remind the reader of what the aim of this thesis is. Below is the 
main question and the four hypotheses presented.  
 To what extent have firms on OMSX30 earned abnormal returns of M&As 
across the business cycle?  
H.1 M&As carried out late within a boom period yield a higher risk of negative 
abnormal returns 
H.2 M&As carried out early within a boom period yield a lower risk of negative 
abnormal returns 
H.3 M&As carried out late within a bust period yield a higher chance of positive 
abnormal returns 
H.4 M&As carried out early within a bust period yield a higher risk of negative 
abnormal returns 
The purpose of this thesis is to measure performance in terms of depth of business 
cycles and also to measure performance across such cycles. By an event study the 
thesis tested the hypotheses with the use of abnormal returns. The results indicate that 
it is more beneficial to perform acquisitions in bust periods. However, the results of 
the testing did not verify any of the hypotheses. M&A literature on the topic of 
business cycle timing of acquisitions is very scarce. Bouwman et al. (2007) found that 
long run performance of M&As is higher when conducted during bust periods but 
they did not test performance as a result of the depth of a business cycle. The findings 
of this thesis also support the research of Pangarkar and Lie (2004), in the sense that 
M&As undertaken in bust periods perform better than M&As undertaken during 
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boom periods. There is even less literature about at what time to acquire within the 
business cycle to gain highest returns like this thesis tested and there is no study 
performed on the Swedish OMXS30 index, which makes the results of this thesis 
additive to existing research such as Bouwman et al. (2007), Pangarkar and Lie 
(2004) and Kusewitt (1985) who all found M&A timing to be best adopted in low-
market cycles. Additionally, there is a vast range of literature that implies that M&As 
are not value creating, e.g. King et al. (2004). Regardless of that, many companies 
pursue their M&A trajectory. The results of this thesis indicate that M&A 
performance is connected to market cycles. One obvious drawback with measuring 
the positive or potential negative effects of M&As is that is it impossible to assess 
how the acquirer would have performed under the scenario that the acquisitions had 
not occurred. One should remember that stock market returns only make up for one 
aspect in terms of M&A success. Apart from measuring the market there can be 
additional studies on integration or strategy to add different dimensions. Reactions of 
the market might not correlate to similar reactions from stakeholders of the 
companies. M&A are in most cases large economic decisions for managers to take. In 
some cases M&A activity seems to be driven by psychology, which might be hard to 
grasp at first. However, the authors believe that adding behavioral aspects of 
managers to M&A activity is important.  
In general, high market-valuations correlate to a higher level of M&A activity. The 
learning from those studies is that managers spend more when the economic 
environment is good. At a personal level, it makes sense. The eagerness to spend 
money is correlated to money available to spend. If you have money, you spend 
money the authors of this thesis suggest. Managers might not be as careful when 
conducting M&A during boom periods as they might be during bust periods. 
Overestimations about synergies, which Sirower (1997) did research on, might be one 
factor causing M&As to fail during boom periods. There are indications in the results 
of this study, i.e. that there was more deals in bust periods than in boom periods, that 
managers have learned. M&A activity of the firm on OMXS30 is not fully correlated 
with the business cycle, which contradicts the findings of e.g. Javanovic and 
Rousseau (2001). It is also important to comprehend the hubris and overoptimism 
theory of Roll (1986) in order to understand M&A activity in boom periods. The 
authors believe that overpaying in boom periods is strongly influenced by hubris of 
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managers in the acquiring firms. There is one last important factor to be considered 
for high stock market M&As. If an overvalued stock is used to purchase a target and 
the stock price declines after the deal is completed, should that then be counted as a 
failed M&A?  
Naturally, there are also doubts about how to best measure performance. This thesis 
had the bidder´s view, but it might be interesting to measure the bidder and the target 
as two stand-alone companies after the M&A to better capture wealth effects. 
However, it should be pointed out that information about private companies is very 
hard to get hold of compared to public companies and that the operating results of the 
target firm is very often embedded in the total result of the bidding company. There 
are also complications on what time frame to use when measuring M&A success. For 
this thesis the authors use three event windows. The results of this thesis provide 
rather strong data on performance across business cycles and performance as a factor 
of the length of the cycles. The authors would like to point out that managers should 
not only undertake acquisitions in bust periods, which might impact the overall 
strategy of the firms they operate, but to provide them evidence of what factors that 
provide the best return. 
5.2 Implications for Further Research 
This thesis has made some conclusions on M&A performance across business cycles. 
As known, the research field of M&A is extensive. The following adjustments could 
potentially be done to improve the results of future research: 
 
 The results in this thesis are based on the Swedish OMXS30. It would be 
interesting to see similar studies conducted on other European stock-indexes to 
get a benchmark for this thesis. 
 
 This thesis did not take other variables into account. The sample had a high 
degree of homogeneity regarding relatedness between buyer and target firm, 
horizontal integration form and almost all deals were private. One future area 
of research might be to compare todays more “related” deals with deals done 
some decades ago to search for differences in abnormal returns across the 
business cycles.  
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 It would be interesting to have a bigger sample size, which could provide a 
higher significance of the results compared to smaller samples.  
 
 For this thesis three event windows were used to assess M&A performance. In 
another study it might be interesting to use additional event windows to get 
more results.  
5.3 Acquisition Guidelines According to This Thesis 
 Acquisitions should be done at a rate sufficient to maintain competiveness and 
market shares, but not carried out when not necessary.  
 
 In general, acquisitions are best made during bearish markets. This disregards 
the method of payment, even though it is possibly better to know when 
acquiring with cash instead of stock. 
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7. Appendix 
7.1 Sample Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
OMXS30 / The Sample 
Alfa Laval AB 
Assa Abloy AB 
Atlas Copco AB 
Boliden AB 
Electrolux AB 
Getinge AB 
H & M Hennes & Mauritz AB 
Modern Times Group MTG AB 
Sandvik AB 
Scania AB 
Securitas AB 
Skanska AB 
SKF AB 
Swedish Match AB 
Svenska Cellulosa AB 
Volvo AB 
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7.2 M&A Activity Compared to OMXS30 
 
Source: Datastream  
 
7.3 GDP of Sweden 
 
Source: Datastream (SCB)  
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7.4 Global M&A Statistics 
7.4.1 Deal value of M&A 
 
Source: Datastream 
7.4.2  Number of Deals 
 
Source: Datastream 
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7.5 Histogram Sample 
7.5.1 7.6.1 Histogram Boom 
 
7.5.2 Histogram Neutral 
 
7.5.3 Histogram Boom 
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7.6 Boom/Bust periods 
7.6.1 First Boom Period 
 
7.6.2 Second Boom Period  
 
7.6.3 Third Boom Period 
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7.6.4 First Bust Period 
 
7.6.5 Second Bust Period 
 
7.6.6 Third Bust Period 
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7.6.7 Forth Bust Period 
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